Friedrich Merz’s fate is a ‘warning’ for Andy Burnham
It took both Andy Burnham and Friedrich Merz three attempts to win the leadership of their parties and ultimately reach the top job. Neither was their party’s natural favourite, but time, doggedness and perhaps the exhaustion of the alternatives eventually delivered the prize they had long coveted. Burnham should hope that is where the similarities end.
Fifteen months after becoming chancellor, Friedrich Merz is in trouble. His approval rating has collapsed, his coalition is fractious and his centre-right CDU/CSU is trailing the populist-right Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) by seven percentage points in the polls. Friedrich Merz has recorded the lowest approval rating for a chancellor since records began. CDU politicians recently told Politico of internal discussions about a Kanzlertausch, or “chancellor swap”. This is an extraordinary prospect in a traditionally stable political system.
The immediate danger comes in east Germany. The AfD is polling above 40% in Saxony-Anhalt, which votes on 6 September, putting it within reach of taking control of a German state for the first time. Two weeks later, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern votes, with the AfD ahead on 36%. An AfD breakthrough into government would be a political earthquake and heap further pressure on Friedrich Merz. Yet his problems contain a broader lesson for Britain’s new prime minister.
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Friedrich Merz stretched the mandate
Friedrich Merz fought the 2025 federal election promising fiscal conservatism. Within days of becoming chancellor, he performed an extraordinary U-turn. Working with the outgoing parliament, he pushed through constitutional changes exempting much defence spending from Germany’s debt brake and created a €500 billion infrastructure fund. Germany needed to rearm, its crumbling infrastructure required investment and its restrictive fiscal rules had become an impediment. It was realpolitik in response to a global order reshaped by Donald Trump’s return to the White House. But it was also a betrayal of the proposition Merz had put to voters. Political mandates are not infinitely elastic. Voters may accept that circumstances change, but repudiating a central election commitment risks losing the trust required to make subsequent difficult decisions. Merz has discovered that borrowing more money does not magically resolve the political constraints on governing.
Burnham starts with an even bigger problem: he has no personal electoral mandate at all. In 2024 the electorate voted for Keir Starmer, Rachel Reeves and their programme while Burnham was not even an MP. That programme promised “change”, but combined higher spending ambitions with a pledge not to raise the three big taxes on working people. Burnham is now trapped. He wants to spend more, his party has demonstrated that it will not readily let him spend less, and Labour’s tax pledges have closed off the most straightforward way of raising the money.
The problems facing Burnham
The result is a government searching for increasingly inventive ways to square the circle before the Budget on 28 October. The danger is that Burnham follows Friedrich Merz in concluding that the only escape is to reinterpret the mandate he inherited – except Britain has far less room for manoeuvre. Germany entered its fiscal expansion with government debt of just 63.5% of GDP in 2025, rising to 68%. Britain’s public-sector net debt is already 94% and the Office for Budget Responsibility expects it to peak above 96%.
The financing requirements make the contrast starker. Germany’s abandonment of its cherished debt brake has been described as a historic fiscal splurge, yet it plans to issue roughly €335 billion of longer-term federal securities this year, against £252 billion of gilts from Britain – almost as much in the same currency despite the German economy being around 50% larger. Britain is already running the sort of debt programme that Germany regards as extraordinary. That leaves Britain far more dependent on keeping bond investors onside. Germany is borrowing from a much stronger starting position and directing much of the money towards infrastructure and defence. Burnham would be asking investors to tolerate yet more borrowing from a country already carrying a much heavier debt burden.
For investors, Britain’s weaker fiscal starting point leaves gilts vulnerable to a greater risk premium than Bunds, particularly if Burnham tests the bond market’s tolerance. The outlook is brighter for defence equities. Rheinmetall’s order book has swollen to around €80 billion, while BAE Systems boasts an £84 billion backlog and its shares have performed well this year.
Britain has advantages elsewhere. Its deeper venture-capital markets and more flexible economy give it a better chance of producing European winners from AI and other emerging technologies. It also has a shock absorber unavailable to Germany: its currency. Sterling can fall when the economy needs to adjust, whereas Germany is locked into the euro. But depreciation is no free lunch: it raises import costs, risks higher inflation and can become a verdict on investors’ confidence.
For Burnham, Friedrich Merz is therefore both a warning and a useful comparison. Merz responded to changing circumstances by abandoning one of his clearest election promises and has paid a heavy political price. Burnham has inherited promises that leave him wanting to spend more and constrained in raising taxes. Borrowing offers an apparent escape, as it did for Merz. But with our debt burden already far higher, the bond market may prove far less forgiving than the electorate.
This article was first published in MoneyWeek’s magazine. Enjoy exclusive early access to news, opinion and analysis from our team of financial experts with a MoneyWeek subscription.
